Arbeitspapier
Activists versus Captured Regulators
We analyze the consequences of activism in a regulated industry where the regulator has been captured by the industry. Unlike ordinary economic agents, activists are insensitive to monetary incentives. Moreover, they are less well informed than regulators and their actions generate dead-weight costs. Yet we find that activism may increase social welfare because it disciplines captured regulators and reduces the social cost of imperfect regulatory systems.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4444
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
public regulation
regulatory capture
pro-industry bias
private politics
activism
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Daubanes, Julien
Rochet, Jean-Charles
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Daubanes, Julien
- Rochet, Jean-Charles
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2013
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