Arbeitspapier

Activists versus Captured Regulators

We analyze the consequences of activism in a regulated industry where the regulator has been captured by the industry. Unlike ordinary economic agents, activists are insensitive to monetary incentives. Moreover, they are less well informed than regulators and their actions generate dead-weight costs. Yet we find that activism may increase social welfare because it disciplines captured regulators and reduces the social cost of imperfect regulatory systems.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4444

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Thema
public regulation
regulatory capture
pro-industry bias
private politics
activism

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Daubanes, Julien
Rochet, Jean-Charles
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Daubanes, Julien
  • Rochet, Jean-Charles
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2013

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