Arbeitspapier

Supervising financial regulators

How much discretion should local financial regulators in a banking union have in accommodating local credit demand? I analyze this question in an economy where local regulators privately observe expected output from high lending. They do not fully internalize default costs from high lending since deposit insurance cannot be priced fairly. Still, output net of default costs across the banking union is highest when local regulators are rewarded rather than punished. Regulators with lower current lending receive more discretion to allow higher lending in the future, but regulators with higher current lending may not experience any limit to their discretion.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper ; No. 2016-52

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Thema
Credit and credit aggregates
Financial stability
Financial systems regulation and policies
Regional economic developments

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Schroth, Josef
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bank of Canada
(wo)
Ottawa
(wann)
2016

DOI
doi:10.34989/swp-2016-52
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:23 MESZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Schroth, Josef
  • Bank of Canada

Entstanden

  • 2016

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