Arbeitspapier

Measuring the Effectiveness of Anti-Cartel Interventions: A Conceptual Framework

This paper develops a model of the birth and death of cartels in the presence of enforcement activities by a Competition Authority (CA). We distinguish three sets of interventions: (a) detecting, prosecuting and penalizing cartels; (b) actions that aim to stop cartel activity in the short-term, immediately following successful prosecution; (c) actions that aim to prevent the re-emergence of prosecuted cartels in the longer term. The last two intervention activities have not been analyzed in the existing literature. In addition we take account of the structure and toughness of penalties. In this framework the enforcement activity of a CA causes industries in which cartels form to oscillate between periods of competitive pricing and periods of cartel pricing. We determine the impact of CA activity on deterred, impeded, and suffered harm. We derive measures of both the total and the marginal effects on welfare resulting from competition authority interventions and show how these break down into measures of the Direct Effect of interventions (i.e. the effect due to cartel activity being impeded) and two Indirect/Behavioral Effects – on Deterrence and Pricing. Finally, we calibrate the model and estimate the fraction of the harm that CAs remove as well as the magnitude of total and marginal welfare effects of anti-cartel interventions.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 16-002/VII

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Antitrust Law
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Thema
Antitrust Enforcement
Antitrust Law
Cartel
Oligopoly
Repeated Games

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Katsoulacos, Yannis
Motchenkova, Evgenia
Ulph, David
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2016

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Katsoulacos, Yannis
  • Motchenkova, Evgenia
  • Ulph, David
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2016

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