Arbeitspapier
Task assignment and organizational form
This paper shows that a firm prefers a process-based task assignment compared to a function based one if the tasks are from functional areas which are neither too complementary nor too substitutable. We consider several projects with contributions from several functional areas. The organization can be structured along processes like product lines (M-form) or along functional areas like marketing or production (U-form). The U-form enables cost savings due to specialization or scale economies. We show that the more effective incentives under the M-form might outweigh these savings if the functions are neither too complementary nor too substitutable.
- ISBN
-
3938369442
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Diskussionsbeiträge ; No. 2006/19
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Organization of Production
- Thema
-
Task Assignment
Organizational Form
Incomplete Contracts
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Puschke, Kerstin
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Freie Universität Berlin, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
2006
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Puschke, Kerstin
- Freie Universität Berlin, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft
Entstanden
- 2006
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