Frictional Assignment

Arbeitspapier

This paper examines efficient and equilibrium allocations in an economy where agents with diverse characteristics are matched through a time-consuming process to produce output. This is cast in a labour market where workers of different skills match with machines of different qualities. The efficient assignment is not always positively assortative and can be decentralized by a competitive mechanism where firms compete by posting wages and committing to the skill that their chosen machines are intended for. Implications on wage inequality are examined.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 988

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Factor Income Distribution ; Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials ; Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
• Thema: Matching ; Efficiency ; Frictions ; Skills: Wage inequality

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Shi, Shouyong
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Queen's University, Department of Economics
• (wo): Kingston (Ontario)
• (wann): 1998

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/189278
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ