Arbeitspapier
Control Aversion in Hierarchies
Companies typically control various aspects of their workers' behaviors. In this paper, we investigate whether the hierarchical distance of the superior who imposes such control measures matters for the workers' ensuing reaction. In particular, we test, in a laboratory experiment, whether potential negative behavioral reactions to imposed control are larger when they are implemented by a direct superior rather than a hierarchically more distant superior. We find that hierarchical proximity indeed magnifies such control aversion and discuss several potential channels for this result.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 9779
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
- Thema
-
control aversion
hierarchies
delegation
principal-agent-problem
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
De Chiara, Alessandro
Engl, Florian
Herz, Holger
Manna, Ester
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2022
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- De Chiara, Alessandro
- Engl, Florian
- Herz, Holger
- Manna, Ester
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2022