Arbeitspapier

Control Aversion in Hierarchies

Companies typically control various aspects of their workers' behaviors. In this paper, we investigate whether the hierarchical distance of the superior who imposes such control measures matters for the workers' ensuing reaction. In particular, we test, in a laboratory experiment, whether potential negative behavioral reactions to imposed control are larger when they are implemented by a direct superior rather than a hierarchically more distant superior. We find that hierarchical proximity indeed magnifies such control aversion and discuss several potential channels for this result.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 9779

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
Thema
control aversion
hierarchies
delegation
principal-agent-problem

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
De Chiara, Alessandro
Engl, Florian
Herz, Holger
Manna, Ester
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2022

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • De Chiara, Alessandro
  • Engl, Florian
  • Herz, Holger
  • Manna, Ester
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2022

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