Control Aversion in Hierarchies

Arbeitspapier

Companies typically control various aspects of their workers' behaviors. In this paper, we investigate whether the hierarchical distance of the superior who imposes such control measures matters for the workers' ensuing reaction. In particular, we test, in a laboratory experiment, whether potential negative behavioral reactions to imposed control are larger when they are implemented by a direct superior rather than a hierarchically more distant superior. We find that hierarchical proximity indeed magnifies such control aversion and discuss several potential channels for this result.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 9779

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
• Subject: control aversion ; hierarchies ; delegation ; principal-agent-problem

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): De Chiara, Alessandro ; Engl, Florian ; Herz, Holger ; Manna, Ester
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2022

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/263709
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET