Arbeitspapier

Positional Power in Hierarchies

Power is a core concept in the analysis and design of organisations. In this paper we consider positional power in hierarchies. One of the problems with the extant literature on positional power in hierarchies is that it is mainly restricted to the analysis of power in terms of the bare positions of the actors. While such an analysis informs us about the authority structure within an organisation, it ignores the decision-making mechanisms completely. The few studies which take into account the decision-making mechanisms make all use of adaptations of well-established approaches for the analysis of power in non-hierarchical organisations such as the Banzhaf measure; and thus they are all based on the structure of a simple game, i.e. they are ‘membershipbased’. We demonstrate that such an approach is in general inappropriate for characterizing power in hierarchies as it cannot be extended to a class of decision-making mechanisms which allow certain actors to terminate a decision before all other members have been involved. As this kind of sequential decision-making mechanism turns out to be particularly relevant for hierarchies, we suggest an action-b! ased approach - represented by an extensive game form - which can take the features of such mechanisms into account. Based on this approach we introduce a power score and measure that can be applied to ascribe positional power to actors in sequential decision making mechanisms.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 07-038/1

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: Other
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Thema
hierarchies
decision-making mechanism
power
positional power
power measure
Hierarchie
Entscheidung
Macht
Autorität
Messung
Extensives Spiel

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
van den Brink, René
Steffen, Frank
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • van den Brink, René
  • Steffen, Frank
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2007

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