Positional Wages, Market Wages and Firm Size

Arbeitspapier

We model a firm in an institutional market setting, consisting of a production technology and its governance. The governance consists of a hierarchical firm structure, a cost efficiency parameter,and an internal pay system. The depth of the firm is determined by profit maximization under the participation restriction that lowest wages meet reservation wages. Reservation wages are endogenously determined in the institutional market economy. We give conditions guaranteeing a finite optimal firm size. Using CES-production technologies we illustrate how firm size depends on labor substitutability, and show that a linear technology yields the deepest structure and a complementary the flattest structure.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 05-020/1

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity ; Firm Organization and Market Structure
• Thema: Optimal firm size ; governance ; hierarchy ; internal organization structure ; cooperative game ; permission value ; labor substitutability ; general equilibrium ; Optimale Betriebsgröße ; Vergütungssystem ; Organisationsstruktur ; Hierarchie ; Gleichgewichtstheorie ; Kooperatives Spiel ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): van den Brink, Rene ; Ruys, Pieter H.M.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Tinbergen Institute
• (wo): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (wann): 2005

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86451
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ