Arbeitspapier

The Influence of Wages on Public Officials' Corruptibility: A Laboratory Investigation

Previous studies have proposed a link between corruption and wages in the public sector. This paper investigates this link using a laboratory experiment. In the experiment, public officials have the opportunity to accept a bribe and can then decide between a neutral and a corrupt action. The corrupt action benefits the briber but poses a large negative externality on a charity. The results show that increasing public officials' wages greatly reduces their corruptibility. In particular, experienced low wage public officials accept 91% of bribes on average, whereas high wage public officials accept 38%. Moreover, high wage public officials are less likely to choose the corrupt option.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 12-038/1

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Thema
bribery
corruption
experimental economics
laboratory experiment

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
van Veldhuizen, Roel
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • van Veldhuizen, Roel
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2012

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