Arbeitspapier
The Influence of Wages on Public Officials' Corruptibility: A Laboratory Investigation
Previous studies have proposed a link between corruption and wages in the public sector. This paper investigates this link using a laboratory experiment. In the experiment, public officials have the opportunity to accept a bribe and can then decide between a neutral and a corrupt action. The corrupt action benefits the briber but poses a large negative externality on a charity. The results show that increasing public officials' wages greatly reduces their corruptibility. In particular, experienced low wage public officials accept 91% of bribes on average, whereas high wage public officials accept 38%. Moreover, high wage public officials are less likely to choose the corrupt option.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 12-038/1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- Thema
-
bribery
corruption
experimental economics
laboratory experiment
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
van Veldhuizen, Roel
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2012
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- van Veldhuizen, Roel
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2012