Arbeitspapier
Catching Hipo's: Screening, Wages and Unemployment
In this paper, I study the wage a firm sets to attract high abilityworkers (hipo's) in situationsof unemployment. I show that the higher unemployment, the larger afirm's incentives to sorthigh and low ability workers. Moreover, workers will signal their(high) ability in situationsof (high) unemployment only if a job offers a high enough wage. Themain result, therefore,says that a firm sets higher wages, the higher unemployment. As themodel is applicable tothe upper segment of the labour market, the result is in line withthe empirical fact thatincome inequality increases when more people are unemployed.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 00-028/1
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets
- Subject
-
Monopsony Power
Labor Market
Screening
Leistungsentgelt
Fachkräfte
Einkommensverteilung
Arbeitslosigkeit
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Janssen, Maarten C.W.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
-
2000
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Janssen, Maarten C.W.
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2000
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