Arbeitspapier
The Influence of Wages on Public Officials' Corruptibility: A Laboratory Investigation
Previous studies have proposed a link between corruption and wages in the public sector. This paper investigates this link using a laboratory experiment. In the experiment, public officials have the opportunity to accept a bribe and can then decide between a neutral and a corrupt action. The corrupt action benefits the briber but poses a large negative externality on a charity. The results show that increasing public officials' wages greatly reduces their corruptibility. In particular, experienced low wage public officials accept 91% of bribes on average, whereas high wage public officials accept 38%. Moreover, high wage public officials are less likely to choose the corrupt option.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 12-038/1
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- Subject
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bribery
corruption
experimental economics
laboratory experiment
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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van Veldhuizen, Roel
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
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Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
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2012
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- van Veldhuizen, Roel
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2012