Arbeitspapier
Market Power in Water Markets
Water markets with market power are analysed as multi-market Cournot competition in which the river structure constrains access to local markets and limited resources impose capacity constraints. Conditions for uniqueness are identified. Lerner indices are larger under binding resource constraints. The number of cases explodes in the number of local markets. Under quadratic benefit functions and symmetric constant marginal extraction costs, closed-form solutions for selected cases are derived, and numerical implementation through a single optimization program is available. Upstream locations face less competition than downstream. Observed price patterns in the Goulburn-Murray Irrigation District are consistent with the theoretical results.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 10-054/1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Renewable Resources and Conservation: Water
- Thema
-
Water markets
oligopoly
market power
Cournot-Walras equilibrium
Wasserwirtschaft
Marktmacht
Oligopol
Allgemeines Gleichgewicht
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Dynamisches Spiel
Neusüdwales
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Ansink, Erik
Houba, Harold
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ansink, Erik
- Houba, Harold
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2010
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