Arbeitspapier

Bidding in hierarchies

This paper reconsiders the comparison between hierarchical contests and single-stage contests. A condition is given that characterizes whether and when the aggregate equilibrium payoff of contestants is higher in the single-stage contest, and when the single-stage contest is more likely to award the prize to the contestant who values it most highly. The outcome depends on inter- and intra-group heterogeneity, and is not driven by free-rider incentives.

Alternative title
Das Bieten in Hierarchien
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2003-27

Classification
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Subject
Contest
hierarchies
rent dissipation

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Konrad, Kai A.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
(where)
Berlin
(when)
2003

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Konrad, Kai A.
  • Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)

Time of origin

  • 2003

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