Investment in the absence of property rights: the role of incumbency advantages

Arbeitspapier

In many situations the individuals who can generate some output must enter a contest for appropriating this output. This paper analyses the investment incentives of such agents and the role of incumbency advantages in the contest. Depending on the advantages, an increase in the productivity of the investment can decrease or increase the amount of investment. The results are applied to autocrats' investment behavior and job specific investment in organizations.

Object Details

• Alternative title: Investitionsanreize bei unvollständigen Eigentumsrechten: die Rolle von Asymmetrien in Aneignungskonflikten
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. FS IV 01-18

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions ; National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Infrastructures; Other Public Investment and Capital Stock ; Economic Development: General ; Capitalist Systems: Political Economy
• Subject: Investment ; endogenous property rights ; contests ; incumbency advantage ; proprietary states

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Konrad, Kai A.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
• (where): Berlin
• (when): 2001

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51142
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET