Arbeitspapier

Disagreement aversion

Experts often disagree. A decision-maker may be averse to such expert disagreement. Existing models of aversion to expert disagreement rest on ambiguity-averse preferences adopting a unanimity principle: If all experts consider one choice better than another, so should the decision-maker. Such unanimity among experts, however, can be spurious, masking substantial disagreement on the underlying reasons. We introduce a novel notion of disagreement aversion to distinguish spurious from genuine unanimity and develop a model that can capture disagreement aversion in our sense. The central element of our model is the cautious aggregation of experts' beliefs.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 22/370

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Thema
Disagreement Aversion
Ambiguity Aversion
Belief Aggregation
Decision under Uncertainty
Precautionary Principle

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bommier, Antoine
Fabre, Adrien
Goussebaïle, Arnaud
Heyen, Daniel
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
(wo)
Zurich
(wann)
2022

DOI
doi:10.3929/ethz-b-000524603
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bommier, Antoine
  • Fabre, Adrien
  • Goussebaïle, Arnaud
  • Heyen, Daniel
  • ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research

Entstanden

  • 2022

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