Arbeitspapier
Disagreement aversion
Experts often disagree. A decision-maker may be averse to such expert disagreement. Existing models of aversion to expert disagreement rest on ambiguity-averse preferences adopting a unanimity principle: If all experts consider one choice better than another, so should the decision-maker. Such unanimity among experts, however, can be spurious, masking substantial disagreement on the underlying reasons. We introduce a novel notion of disagreement aversion to distinguish spurious from genuine unanimity and develop a model that can capture disagreement aversion in our sense. The central element of our model is the cautious aggregation of experts' beliefs.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 22/370
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Thema
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Disagreement Aversion
Ambiguity Aversion
Belief Aggregation
Decision under Uncertainty
Precautionary Principle
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Bommier, Antoine
Fabre, Adrien
Goussebaïle, Arnaud
Heyen, Daniel
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
- (wo)
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Zurich
- (wann)
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2022
- DOI
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doi:10.3929/ethz-b-000524603
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bommier, Antoine
- Fabre, Adrien
- Goussebaïle, Arnaud
- Heyen, Daniel
- ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
Entstanden
- 2022