Competition in the workplace: An experimental investigation

Arbeitspapier

We analyze competition between workers in a gift-exchange experiment where two workers are hired by the same employer. In the competition treatment the two employees simultaneously choose their effort whereas in the baseline treatment competition cannot occur since there is only one employee per employer. We find that in the competition treatment employers implicitly set tournament incentives by rewarding employees who choose higher effort levels than their co-workers. Here, employees' effort levels increase significantly faster, which can be explained by imitation learning. Furthermore we find that employers decrease their wage payments per unit of effort exerted over time when employing two workers.

Object Details

• ISBN: 978-3-86304-052-9
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 53

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Labor Contracts ; Firm Organization and Market Structure ; Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
• Subject: Gift Exchange ; Competition ; Internal Organization ; Multiple Employees

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Benndorf, Volker ; Rau, Holger A.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
• (where): Düsseldorf
• (when): 2012

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/58183
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET