Arbeitspapier

Cournot competition between teams: an experimental study

In the economic literature on market competition, firms are often modelled as individual decision makers and the internal organization of the firm is neglected (unitary player assumption). However, as the literature on strategic delegation suggests, one can not generally expect that the behavior of teams is equivalent to the behavior of individuals in Cournot competition. Nevertheless, there are models of team-organization such that team-firms and individual firms are behaviorally equivalent. This provides a theoretical foundation for the unitary player assumption in Cournot competition. We show that this assumption is robust in experiments, which is in contrast to experimental results on price competition.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 06-26

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Firm Behavior: Theory
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Firm Organization and Market Structure
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Schipper, Burkhard C.
Raab, Philippe
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of California, Department of Economics
(wo)
Davis, CA
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Schipper, Burkhard C.
  • Raab, Philippe
  • University of California, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2007

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