Cournot competition between teams: an experimental study

Arbeitspapier

In the economic literature on market competition, firms are often modelled as individual decision makers and the internal organization of the firm is neglected (unitary player assumption). However, as the literature on strategic delegation suggests, one can not generally expect that the behavior of teams is equivalent to the behavior of individuals in Cournot competition. Nevertheless, there are models of team-organization such that team-firms and individual firms are behaviorally equivalent. This provides a theoretical foundation for the unitary player assumption in Cournot competition. We show that this assumption is robust in experiments, which is in contrast to experimental results on price competition.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 06-26

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Firm Behavior: Theory ; Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Firm Organization and Market Structure ; Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Schipper, Burkhard C. ; Raab, Philippe
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of California, Department of Economics
• (where): Davis, CA
• (when): 2007

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31354
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET