Cournot Competition between Teams: An Experimental Study

Arbeitspapier

In the economic literature on market competition, firms are often modeled as single decision makers and the internal organization of the firm is neglected (unitary player assumption). However, as the literature on strategic delegation suggests, one can not generally expect that the behavior of teams is equivalent to the behavior of individuals in Cournot competition. Nevertheless, there are models of team-organization such that teams and individuals are behaviorally equivalent providing a theoretical foundation for the unitary player assumption in Cournot competition. We show that this assumption is robust in experiments in contrast to analog experimental results on price-competition in the literature.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 13/2004

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Firm Behavior: Theory ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Noncooperative Games ; Firm Organization and Market Structure ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
• Subject: unitary player assumption ; experiments ; group behavior ; theory of the firm ; Wettbewerb ; Duopol ; Theorie der Unternehmung ; Gruppenentscheidung ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Experiment ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Schipper, Burkhard C. ; Raab, Philippe
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2004

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22891
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET