- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 597
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
-
Lernprozess
Unvollkommene Information
Theorie
Wiederholte Spiele
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Nachbar, John H.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (where)
-
Osaka
- (when)
-
2003
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Nachbar, John H.
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Time of origin
- 2003
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