Grandfather rights in the market for airport slots

Arbeitspapier

Grandfather rights are currently used in the European Union to allocate airport slots. This article shows that airports prefer such a use-it-or-lose-it rule to unconditional property rights. Assuming that there are informational asymmetries between airports and air carriers because air carriers have better information on passenger demand, the use-it-or-lose-it rule increases slot use when demand for air transport is low. Airport prots increase and those of the air carriers, together with social welfare, decrease. The prot-maximizing rule is a use-it- g < 1-or-lose-it rule.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Economics Department Working Paper Series ; No. 4

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Air Transportation ; Transportation Economics: Government Pricing and Policy ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly
• Thema: Airports ; Grandfather rights ; use-it-or-lose-it rule ; airport slots

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Sieg, Gernot
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Technische Universität Braunschweig, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre
• (wo): Braunschweig
• (wann): 2009

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51313
• URN: urn:nbn:de:gbv:084-24464
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ