Congestion pricing vs. slot constraints to airport networks

Arbeitspapier

Congestion has become a problem for many airports throughout the world. Two different policy options to control congestion are analyzed in this paper: slot constraints and congestion pricing. In particular, our model takes into account that the airline industry is characterized by significant demand uncertainty. Furthermore, due to the network character of the airline industry, the demand for airport capacities normally is complementary. We show that this favors the use of slot constraints compared to congestion pricing from a social point of view. In contrast, for monopolistic airports, prices as instruments constitute a dominant choice.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Diskussionspapier ; No. 2006/3

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly ; Air Transportation
• Thema: Slots ; uncertainty ; monopolistic airports ; regulation ; Flughafen ; Bottleneck ; Verkehrstarif ; Netzzugang ; Luftverkehrspolitik ; Monopol ; Wohlfahrtseffekt ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Czerny, Achim I.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Technische Universität Berlin, Fakultät Wirtschaft und Management
• (wo): Berlin
• (wann): 2006

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36438
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ