Arbeitspapier
When Inertia Generates Political Cycles
We propose a simple infinite horizon of repeated elections with two candidates. Furthermore we suppose that the government policy presents some degree of inertia, i.e. a new government cannot completely change the policy implemented by the incumbent. When the policy inertia is strong enough, no party can win the election a consecutive infinite number of times.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 91.2006
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Thema
-
Political Cycles
Inertia
Politischer Konjunkturzyklus
Wahl
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Soubeyran, Raphäel
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
2006
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Soubeyran, Raphäel
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 2006
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