Arbeitspapier
Welfare Effects of Short-Time Compensation
We study welfare effects of public short-time compensation (STC) in a model in which firms respond to idiosyncratic profitability shocks by adjusting employment and hours per worker. Introducing STC substantially improves welfare by mitigating distortions caused by public unemployment insurance (UI), but only if firms have access to private insurance. Otherwise firms respond to low profitability by combining layoffs with long hours for remaining workers, rather than by taking up STC. Optimal STC is substantially less generous than UI even when firms have access to private insurance, and equally generous STC is worse than not offering STC at all.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5063
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
- Thema
-
short-time compensation
unemployment insurance
welfare
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Braun, Helge
Brügemann, Björn
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
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Munich
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Braun, Helge
- Brügemann, Björn
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2014