Arbeitspapier

Welfare Effects of Short-Time Compensation

We study welfare effects of public short-time compensation (STC) in a model in which firms respond to idiosyncratic profitability shocks by adjusting employment and hours per worker. Introducing STC substantially improves welfare by mitigating distortions caused by public unemployment insurance (UI), but only if firms have access to private insurance. Otherwise firms respond to low profitability by combining layoffs with long hours for remaining workers, rather than by taking up STC. Optimal STC is substantially less generous than UI even when firms have access to private insurance, and equally generous STC is worse than not offering STC at all.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5063

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
Thema
short-time compensation
unemployment insurance
welfare

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Braun, Helge
Brügemann, Björn
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Braun, Helge
  • Brügemann, Björn
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2014

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