Inefficient Short-Time Work

Arbeitspapier

This paper shows that the reforms which expanded short-time work in France after the great 2008-2009 recession were largely to the benefit of large firms which are recurrent short-time work users. We argue that this expansion of short-time work is an inefficient way to provide insurance to workers, as it entails cross-subsidies which reduce aggregate production. An efficient policy should provide unemployment insurance benefits funded by experience rated employers' contributions instead of short-time work benefits. We find that short-time work entails significant production losses compared to an unemployment insurance scheme with experience rating.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 11010

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Labor Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs ; Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
• Thema: short-time work ; unemployment insurance ; experience rating

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Cahuc, Pierre ; Nevoux, Sandra
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2017

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/170994
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ