Arbeitspapier

Short-time Work Subsidies in a Matching Model

We consider positive and normative aspects of subsidizing work arrangements where subsidies are paid in time of low demand and reduced working hours so as to stabilize workers’ income. In a matching framework such an arrangement increases labor demand. Tightening eligibility to short-time work benefits tends to reduce the wage while the impact on unemployment remains ambiguous. We develop a modified Hosios condition characterizing an efficient combination of labor market tightness and short-time benefit loss rate.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7281

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; includes inheritance and gift taxes
Labor Contracts
Labor Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
Thema
short-time work
unemployment insurance
employment subsidies

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Meier, Volker
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2018

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Meier, Volker
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2018

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