Short-time Work Subsidies in a Matching Model

Arbeitspapier

We consider positive and normative aspects of subsidizing work arrangements where subsidies are paid in time of low demand and reduced working hours so as to stabilize workers’ income. In a matching framework such an arrangement increases labor demand. Tightening eligibility to short-time work benefits tends to reduce the wage while the impact on unemployment remains ambiguous. We develop a modified Hosios condition characterizing an efficient combination of labor market tightness and short-time benefit loss rate.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7281

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity ; Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; includes inheritance and gift taxes ; Labor Contracts ; Labor Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs ; Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
• Subject: short-time work ; unemployment insurance ; employment subsidies

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Meier, Volker
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2018

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/185479
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET