Arbeitspapier

Welfare Effects of Short-Time Compensation

We study welfare effects of public short-time compensation (STC) in a model in which firms respond to idiosyncratic profitability shocks by adjusting employment and hours per worker. Introducing STC substantially improves welfare by mitigating distortions caused by public unemployment insurance (UI), but only if firms have access to private insurance. Otherwise firms respond to low profitability by combining layoffs with long hours for remaining workers, rather than by taking up STC. Optimal STC is substantially less generous than UI even when firms have access to private insurance, and equally generous STC is worse than not offering STC at all.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 8597

Classification
Wirtschaft
Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
Subject
short-time compensation
unemployment insurance
welfare

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Braun, Helge
Brügemann, Björn
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2014

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Braun, Helge
  • Brügemann, Björn
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2014

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