Optimal and Fair Prizing in Sequential Round-Robin Tournaments: Experimental Evidence

Arbeitspapier

We report results from the first experimental study of round-robin tournaments. In our experiment, we investigate how the prize structure affects the intensity, fair-ness, and dynamic behavior in sequential round-robin tournaments with three players. We compare tournaments with a second prize equal to either 0%, 50%, or 100% of the first prize. While theory predicts the 50%-treatment to be most intense, we find that aggregate effort is highest in the 0%-treatment. In contrast, our evidence supports the predictions that the 50%-treatment is fairest (though not perfectly fair), whereas the late mover is advantaged in the 100%-treatment and disadvantaged in the 0%-treatment. Also in line with the theory, we identify a strategic (reverse) momentum: after winning the first match, a player increases (decreases) effort in the second match of the 0%-treatment (100%-treatment). Additional findings suggest that dynamic behavior is also subject to a psychological momentum.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 9651

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Sports Economics: General
• Subject: sequential round-robin tournament ; all-pay auction ; fairness ; intensity ; strategic momentum ; experiment

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Lauber, Arne ; March, Christoph ; Sahm, Marco
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2022

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/260781
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET