Arbeitspapier
Preemptive Behavior in Sequential Tournaments
Rank-order tournaments are usually modeled simultaneously. However, real tournaments are often sequentially. We show that agents' strategic behavior significantly differs in sequential tournaments compared to simultaneous tournaments. In a sequential tournament, under certain conditions the first acting agent chooses a preemptively high effort so that the following agent gives up. In general, the principal will prefer simultaneous tournaments in which preemptive behavior is impossible.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 159
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Labor Contracts
- Subject
-
Preemptive behavior
rank-order tournaments
sequential tournaments
Agency Theory
Wettbewerb
Spieltheorie
Theorie
Tournament
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Jost, Peter-Jürgen
Kräkel, Matthias
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (where)
-
Bonn
- (when)
-
2000
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Jost, Peter-Jürgen
- Kräkel, Matthias
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Time of origin
- 2000
Other Objects (12)
Preemptive Behavior in Sequential-Move Tournaments with Heterogeneous Agents
Are sequential round-robin tournaments discriminatory?
Are Sequential Round-Robin Tournaments Discriminatory?
Sequential Round-Robin Tournaments with Multiple Prizes
Sequential round-robin tournaments with multiple prizes
The role of budget constraints in sequential elimination tournaments
Optimal and Fair Prizing in Sequential Round-Robin Tournaments: Experimental Evidence
Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments: Experimental evidence
Risk taking behavior in tournaments: evidence from the NBA
Splitting Tournaments
Multilayered tournaments
The impact of psychological traits on performance in sequential tournaments: Evidence from a tennis field experiment
Preemptive Behavior in Sequential-Move Tournaments with Heterogeneous Agents
Are sequential round-robin tournaments discriminatory?
Are Sequential Round-Robin Tournaments Discriminatory?
Sequential Round-Robin Tournaments with Multiple Prizes
Sequential round-robin tournaments with multiple prizes
The role of budget constraints in sequential elimination tournaments
Optimal and Fair Prizing in Sequential Round-Robin Tournaments: Experimental Evidence
Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments: Experimental evidence
Risk taking behavior in tournaments: evidence from the NBA
Splitting Tournaments
Multilayered tournaments
The impact of psychological traits on performance in sequential tournaments: Evidence from a tennis field experiment
Preemptive Behavior in Sequential-Move Tournaments with Heterogeneous Agents
Are sequential round-robin tournaments discriminatory?
Are Sequential Round-Robin Tournaments Discriminatory?
Sequential Round-Robin Tournaments with Multiple Prizes
Sequential round-robin tournaments with multiple prizes
The role of budget constraints in sequential elimination tournaments
Optimal and Fair Prizing in Sequential Round-Robin Tournaments: Experimental Evidence
Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments: Experimental evidence
Risk taking behavior in tournaments: evidence from the NBA
Splitting Tournaments
Multilayered tournaments