Arbeitspapier

Are Sequential Round-Robin Tournaments Discriminatory?

I examine sequential round-robin tournaments with three and four symmetric players. Each player is matched once with each other player. If the matches are organized as Tullock contests (all-pay auctions), the tournament will be almost fair (highly discriminatory): subject to the position of their matches in the sequence of the tournament, the differences in players’ ex-ante winning probabilities and expected payoffs will be small (large). The differing results originate from the higher discriminating power of the all-pay auction. Moreover, the resulting discouragement effect in tournaments with all-pay auctions implies lower aggregate effort than in tournaments with suitable Tullock contests. The fairness of round-robin tournaments may be improved by the use of an endogenous sequence of matches or the requirement that players fix their effort ex-ante.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6421

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Sports Economics: General
Thema
sequential round-robin tournament
contest success function
discriminatory power
Tullock contest
all-pay auction

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Sahm, Marco
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2017

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Sahm, Marco
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2017

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