Arbeitspapier
Are Sequential Round-Robin Tournaments Discriminatory?
I examine sequential round-robin tournaments with three and four symmetric players. Each player is matched once with each other player. If the matches are organized as Tullock contests (all-pay auctions), the tournament will be almost fair (highly discriminatory): subject to the position of their matches in the sequence of the tournament, the differences in players’ ex-ante winning probabilities and expected payoffs will be small (large). The differing results originate from the higher discriminating power of the all-pay auction. Moreover, the resulting discouragement effect in tournaments with all-pay auctions implies lower aggregate effort than in tournaments with suitable Tullock contests. The fairness of round-robin tournaments may be improved by the use of an endogenous sequence of matches or the requirement that players fix their effort ex-ante.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6421
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Sports Economics: General
- Thema
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sequential round-robin tournament
contest success function
discriminatory power
Tullock contest
all-pay auction
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Sahm, Marco
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
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Munich
- (wann)
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2017
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Sahm, Marco
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2017