Are sequential round-robin tournaments discriminatory?

Arbeitspapier

I examine sequential round-robin tournaments with three and four symmetric players. Each player is matched once with each other player. If the matches are organized as Tullock contests (all-pay auctions), the tournament will be almost fair (highly discriminatory): subject to the position of their matches in the sequence of the tournament, the differences in players' ex-ante winning probabilities and expected payoffs will be small (large). The differing results originate from the higher discriminating power of the all-pay auction. Moreover, the resulting discouragement effect in tournaments with all-pay auctions implies lower aggregate effort than in tournaments with suitable Tullock contests. The fairness of round-robin tournaments may be improved by the use of an endogenous sequence of matches or the requirement that players fix their effort ex-ante.

Object Details

• ISBN: 978-3-943153-40-8
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: BERG Working Paper Series ; No. 121

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Sports Economics: General
• Subject: Sequential Round-Robin Tournament ; Contest Success Function ; Discriminatory Power ; Tullock Contest ; All-Pay Auction

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Sahm, Marco
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group (BERG)
• (where): Bamberg
• (when): 2017

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/157288
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET