Lobbying, information transmission, and unequal representation
Abstract: "We study the effects of unequal representation in the interest-group system on the degree of information transmission between a lobbyist and a policymaker. Employing a dynamic cheap-talk model in which the lobbyist cares instrumentally about his reputation for truthtelling, we show that the larger is the inequality, the less information can credibly be transmitted to the policymaker. We also investigate the effects of inequality on welfare and discuss the welfare effects of institutions that increase transparency but which as well, as an unintended side-effect, lower the lobbyist's incentives for truthtelling." (author's abstract)
- Alternative title
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Lobbying, Informationsübertragung und ungleiche Repräsentation
- Location
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Extent
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Online-Ressource, 28 S.
- Language
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Englisch
- Notes
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Veröffentlichungsversion
- Bibliographic citation
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Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und politische Ökonomie, Abteilung Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und industrieller Wandel ; Bd. 2004-02
- Keyword
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Interessenpolitik
Interessenvertretung
Informationsfluss
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (where)
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Berlin
- (when)
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2004
- Creator
- Contributor
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Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-117543
- Rights
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Open Access unbekannt; Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
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15.08.2025, 7:32 AM CEST
Data provider
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Lagerlöf, Johan
- Frisell, Lars
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Time of origin
- 2004