Lobbying, information transmission, and unequal representation

Abstract: "We study the effects of unequal representation in the interest-group system on the degree of information transmission between a lobbyist and a policymaker. Employing a dynamic cheap-talk model in which the lobbyist cares instrumentally about his reputation for truthtelling, we show that the larger is the inequality, the less information can credibly be transmitted to the policymaker. We also investigate the effects of inequality on welfare and discuss the welfare effects of institutions that increase transparency but which as well, as an unintended side-effect, lower the lobbyist's incentives for truthtelling." (author's abstract)

Alternative title
Lobbying, Informationsübertragung und ungleiche Repräsentation
Location
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Extent
Online-Ressource, 28 S.
Language
Englisch
Notes
Veröffentlichungsversion

Bibliographic citation
Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und politische Ökonomie, Abteilung Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und industrieller Wandel ; Bd. 2004-02

Keyword
Interessenpolitik
Interessenvertretung
Informationsfluss

Event
Veröffentlichung
(where)
Berlin
(when)
2004
Creator
Contributor
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH

URN
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-117543
Rights
Open Access unbekannt; Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
Last update
15.08.2025, 7:32 AM CEST

Data provider

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Associated

Time of origin

  • 2004

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