Lobbying, information transmission, and unequal representation

Abstract: "We study the effects of unequal representation in the interest-group system on the degree of information transmission between a lobbyist and a policymaker. Employing a dynamic cheap-talk model in which the lobbyist cares instrumentally about his reputation for truthtelling, we show that the larger is the inequality, the less information can credibly be transmitted to the policymaker. We also investigate the effects of inequality on welfare and discuss the welfare effects of institutions that increase transparency but which as well, as an unintended side-effect, lower the lobbyist's incentives for truthtelling." (author's abstract)

Object Details

• Alternative title: Lobbying, Informationsübertragung und ungleiche Repräsentation
• Location: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Extent: Online-Ressource, 28 S.
• Language: Englisch
• Notes: Veröffentlichungsversion

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und politische Ökonomie, Abteilung Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und industrieller Wandel ; Bd. 2004-02

Classification and Topics

• Keyword: Interessenpolitik ; Interessenvertretung ; Informationsfluss

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (where): Berlin
• (when): 2004
• Creator: Lagerlöf, Johan ; Frisell, Lars
• Contributor: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH

Further information

• URN: urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-117543
• Rights: Open Access unbekannt; Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Last update: 15.08.2025, 7:32 AM CEST