Arbeitspapier

Moral-Hazard-Free First-Best Unemployment Insurance

Unemployment insurance replacement rates world-wide are well below 100 percent, a fact often attributed to search moral hazard concerns. As Blanchard and Tirole (2008) have illustrated, however, neither search nor layoff moral hazard (firing cost) distortions need arise in first-best insurance plans. Their counterexample depends on the functional form of the state utility function--utility with a single argument, consumption plus monetized leisure. The monetized leisure model is unattractive if leisure is a choice variable, however, and a review of the optimal UI literature reveals a surprising variety of alternative utility function assumptions. A standard neoclassical utility function is used to characterize the utility function conditions required to generate moral-hazard-free (MHF) first-best contracts. Two conditions emerge: (i) the necessary condition that leisure and consumption be substitutes (the cross-derivative of consumption and leisure be negative) and (ii) the sufficient condition that leisure be an inferior good, Rosen (1985). Leisure appears to be a normal good, which rules out the possibility of first-best moral-hazard-free (FB MHF) utility structures, but the first-best UI replacement rate remains very much an open question. The rich empirical literature on the "retirement consumption paradox" suggests that the rate is below 100 percent, easing moral hazard concerns, if not eliminating them.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 9824

Classification
Wirtschaft
Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
Labor Contracts
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Labor Economics Policies
Subject
unemployment insurance
utility functions
moral hazard
firing costs
consumption
retirement

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Parsons, Donald O.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2016

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Parsons, Donald O.
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2016

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