Arbeitspapier
Active Unemployment Insurance
The paper argues that a comprehensive activation strategy is called for in both unemployment and disability insurance to minimize the conflict between income insurance and work incentives and to prevent the economic crisis from causing a long-lasting decline in labor force participation. A review of recent empirical evidence, particularly from the Scandinavian countries indicates that mild activation requirements effectively counteract moral hazard problems in social insurance. The paper also argues that the distinction between unemployment and disability is blurred, and that both temporary and permanent disability insurance programs should be designed to encourage and support the use of remaining (partial) work capacity.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Policy Paper ; No. 41
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Social Security and Public Pensions
Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
- Thema
-
activation
moral hazard
disability insurance
unemployment insurance
ALMP
Arbeitslosenversicherung
Lohnfortzahlung
Aktivierende Arbeitsmarktpolitik
Moral Hazard
Ökonomischer Anreiz
Deutschland
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Røed, Knut
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2012
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Røed, Knut
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2012