Arbeitspapier

Active Unemployment Insurance

The paper argues that a comprehensive activation strategy is called for – in both unemployment and disability insurance – to minimize the conflict between income insurance and work incentives and to prevent the economic crisis from causing a long-lasting decline in labor force participation. A review of recent empirical evidence, particularly from the Scandinavian countries indicates that mild activation requirements effectively counteract moral hazard problems in social insurance. The paper also argues that the distinction between unemployment and disability is blurred, and that both temporary and permanent disability insurance programs should be designed to encourage and support the use of remaining (partial) work capacity.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Policy Paper ; No. 41

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Social Security and Public Pensions
Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
Thema
activation
moral hazard
disability insurance
unemployment insurance
ALMP
Arbeitslosenversicherung
Lohnfortzahlung
Aktivierende Arbeitsmarktpolitik
Moral Hazard
Ökonomischer Anreiz
Deutschland

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Røed, Knut
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Røed, Knut
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2012

Ähnliche Objekte (12)