Arbeitspapier
Moral Hazard, Market Power, and Second Best Health Insurance
Individual moral hazard engendered by health insurance and monopolistic production are both typical phenomena of drug markets. We develop a simple model containing these two elements and evaluate the market equilibrium on the basis of consumer and social welfare. The consumer welfare criterion suggests that in the market equilibrium individuals purchase too much insurance against the risk of drug expenses. In contrast, the social welfare criterion suggests that individuals should purchase more insurance coverage than they choose to do in the market equilibrium.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CSLE Discussion Paper ; No. 2002-06
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly
Analysis of Health Care Markets
National Government Expenditures and Health
- Thema
-
Drugs
Insurance
Monopoly
Welfare
Krankenversicherung
Versicherungsökonomik
Arzneimittelmarkt
Monopol
Moral Hazard
Wohlfahrtseffekt
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Wigger, Berthold U.
Anlauf, Markus
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Universität des Saarlandes, Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE)
- (wo)
-
Saarbrücken
- (wann)
-
2002
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Wigger, Berthold U.
- Anlauf, Markus
- Universität des Saarlandes, Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE)
Entstanden
- 2002