Arbeitspapier
Social norms and economic incentives in firms
This paper studies the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in firms. We introduce a general framework to model social norms arguing that norms stem from agents' desire for, or peer pressure towards, social efficiency. In a simple model of team production we examine the interplay of different types of contracts with social norms. We show that one and the same norm can be output-increasing, neutral, or output-decreasing depending on the incentive scheme. We also show how social norms can induce multiplicity of equilibria and how steeper economic incentives can reduce effort.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 5264
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- Thema
-
social norms
incentives
contracts
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Huck, Steffen
Kübler, Dorothea
Weibull, Jörgen W.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Huck, Steffen
- Kübler, Dorothea
- Weibull, Jörgen W.
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2010