Arbeitspapier
Social Norms and Optimal Incentives in Firms
This paper deals with the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in firms. We outline a simple model of team production and provide preliminary results on linear incentive schemes in the presence of a social norm that may cause multiple equilibria. The effect of the social norm on the optimal bonus rate is discussed, as well as the effectiveness of temporary changes in the bonus rate as a means to move a firm from a bad to a good equilibrium.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IUI Working Paper ; No. 565
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- Thema
-
Social Norms
Incentives
Contracts
Leistungsanreiz
Leistungsentgelt
Theorie
Soziale Norm
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Huck, Steffen
Kübler, Dorothea
Weibull, Jörgen
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)
- (wo)
-
Stockholm
- (wann)
-
2001
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Huck, Steffen
- Kübler, Dorothea
- Weibull, Jörgen
- The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)
Entstanden
- 2001