Non-Manipulable Domains for the Borda Count

Arbeitspapier

We characterize the preference domains on which the Borda count satisfies Arrow's ``independence of irrelevant alternatives" condition. Under a weak richness condition, these domains are obtained by fixing one preference ordering and including all its cyclic permutations (``Condorcet cycles"). We then ask on which domains the Borda count is non-manipulable. It turns out that it is non-manipulable on a broader class of domains when combined with appropriately chosen tie-breaking rules. On the other hand, we also prove that the rich domains on which the Borda count is non-manipulable for all possible tie-breaking rules are again the cyclic permutation domains.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 13/2003

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
• Subject: Borda count ; scoring methods ; non-manipulability ; Unmöglichkeitstheorem ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Barbie, Martin ; Puppe, Clemens ; Tasnádi, Attila
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2003

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22863
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET