Arbeitspapier
Non-Manipulable Domains for the Borda Count
We characterize the preference domains on which the Borda count satisfies Arrow's ``independence of irrelevant alternatives" condition. Under a weak richness condition, these domains are obtained by fixing one preference ordering and including all its cyclic permutations (``Condorcet cycles"). We then ask on which domains the Borda count is non-manipulable. It turns out that it is non-manipulable on a broader class of domains when combined with appropriately chosen tie-breaking rules. On the other hand, we also prove that the rich domains on which the Borda count is non-manipulable for all possible tie-breaking rules are again the cyclic permutation domains.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 13/2003
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Thema
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Borda count
scoring methods
non-manipulability
Unmöglichkeitstheorem
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Barbie, Martin
Puppe, Clemens
Tasnádi, Attila
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2003
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Barbie, Martin
- Puppe, Clemens
- Tasnádi, Attila
- University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
Entstanden
- 2003
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