Arbeitspapier
On strategy-proof social choice between two alternatives
We study strategy-proof rules for choosing between two alternatives. We consider the full preference domain which allows for indifference. In this framework, for strategy proof rules, ontoness does not imply efficiency. We weaken the requirement of efficiency to ontoness and characterizes the class of strategy-proof rules. We argue that the notion of effciency is not desirable always. Our main result provides a simple characterization of the class of onto, anonymous and strategy-proof rules in this framework. Our analysis can help policy makers choose among these rules.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 1013
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Subject
-
Strategy-proofness
Anonymity
Generalized voting by committees
Quota rules
Welfare dominance under preference replacement
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Lahiri, Abhinaba
Pramanik, Anup
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (where)
-
Osaka
- (when)
-
2017
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Lahiri, Abhinaba
- Pramanik, Anup
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Time of origin
- 2017
Other Objects (12)
Maximal domains for strategy-proof or Maskin monotonic choice rules
Strategy-Proof Exchange
Strategy-Proof Package Assignment
Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules
Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms
Strategy-Proof and Fair Wages
Pairwise partition graphs and strategy-proof social choice in the exogenous indifference class model
A Characterization of Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions for Economies with Pure Public Goods
Contractual federalism and strategy-proof coordination
Strategy-proof Location on a Network
Strategy-Proof Allocation of Objects Revisited
A strategy-proof mechanism should be announced to be strategy-proof: An experiment for the Vickrey auction
Maximal domains for strategy-proof or Maskin monotonic choice rules
Strategy-Proof Exchange
Strategy-Proof Package Assignment
Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules
Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms
Strategy-Proof and Fair Wages
Pairwise partition graphs and strategy-proof social choice in the exogenous indifference class model
A Characterization of Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions for Economies with Pure Public Goods
Contractual federalism and strategy-proof coordination
Strategy-proof Location on a Network
Strategy-Proof Allocation of Objects Revisited
A strategy-proof mechanism should be announced to be strategy-proof: An experiment for the Vickrey auction
Maximal domains for strategy-proof or Maskin monotonic choice rules
Strategy-Proof Exchange
Strategy-Proof Package Assignment
Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules
Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms
Strategy-Proof and Fair Wages
Pairwise partition graphs and strategy-proof social choice in the exogenous indifference class model
A Characterization of Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions for Economies with Pure Public Goods
Contractual federalism and strategy-proof coordination
Strategy-proof Location on a Network
Strategy-Proof Allocation of Objects Revisited