A detail-free mediator

Arbeitspapier

We present an extension to any finite complete information game with two players. In the extension, players are allowed to communicate directly and, additionally, send private messages to a simple, detail-free mediator, which, in turn, makes public announcements as a deterministic function of the private messages. The extension captures situations in which people engage in face-to-face communication and can observe the opponent's face during the conversation before choosing actions in some underlying game. We prove that the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of the extended game approximately coincides with the set of correlated equilibrium payoffs of any underlying game.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Cardiff Economics Working Papers ; No. E2012/10

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games
• Subject: correlated equilibrium ; detail-free mechanism ; mediated pre-play communication

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Vida, Péter ; Azacis, Helmuts
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
• (where): Cardiff
• (when): 2012

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/65729
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET