Arbeitspapier
Optimal mechanisms for an auction mediator
We consider a dynamic auction environment with a long-lived seller and short-lived buyers mediated by a third party. A mediator has incomplete information about traders' values and selects an auction mechanism to maximize her expected revenue. We characterize mediator-optimal mechanisms and show that an optimal mechanism has a simple implementation as a Vickrey auction with a reserve price where the seller pays to the mediator only a fixed percentage from the closing price.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 670
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Auctions
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Subject
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optimal mechanism
Vickrey auction
mediator
Auktionstheorie
Unvollkommene Information
Eigeninteresse
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Matros, Alexander
Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
- (where)
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London
- (when)
-
2010
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Matros, Alexander
- Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
- Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
Time of origin
- 2010
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