Arbeitspapier
Optimal mechanisms for an auction mediator
We consider a dynamic auction environment with a long-lived seller and short-lived buyers mediated by a third party. A mediator has incomplete information about traders' values and selects an auction mechanism to maximize her expected revenue. We characterize mediator-optimal mechanisms and show that an optimal mechanism has a simple implementation as a Vickrey auction with a reserve price where the seller pays to the mediator only a fixed percentage from the closing price.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 670
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Auctions
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
optimal mechanism
Vickrey auction
mediator
Auktionstheorie
Unvollkommene Information
Eigeninteresse
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Matros, Alexander
Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
- (wo)
-
London
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Matros, Alexander
- Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
- Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
Entstanden
- 2010
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