Arbeitspapier

A detail-free mediator

We present an extension to any finite complete information game with two players. In the extension, players are allowed to communicate directly and, additionally, send private messages to a simple, detail-free mediator, which, in turn, makes public announcements as a deterministic function of the private messages. The extension captures situations in which people engage in face-to-face communication and can observe the opponent's face during the conversation before choosing actions in some underlying game. We prove that the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of the extended game approximately coincides with the set of correlated equilibrium payoffs of any underlying game.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Cardiff Economics Working Papers ; No. E2012/10

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Thema
correlated equilibrium
detail-free mechanism
mediated pre-play communication

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Vida, Péter
Azacis, Helmuts
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
(wo)
Cardiff
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Vida, Péter
  • Azacis, Helmuts
  • Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School

Entstanden

  • 2012

Ähnliche Objekte (12)