Arbeitspapier
Auction Design with Interdependent Valuations: The Generalized Revelation Principle, Efficiency, Full Surplus Extraction and Information Acquisition
Agents' valuations are interdependent if they depend on the signals of all agents. Previous literature has claimed that with interdependent valuations and multidimen-sional, but independent, signals, efficient auction design is impossible. This paper shows that, on the contrary, it is always possible to find efficient auction mechanisms. Furthermore, it characterizes the conditions under which it is possible to extract the full surplus from the agents. Finally, it shows that it is also possible to provide agents with the incentives for the efficient, ex-ante acquisition of information. All these results rest on the application of a generalized version of the revelation principle, which requires that the designer uses two reporting stages.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 21.2003
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Auctions
- Subject
-
Auction Design
Interdependent Valuations
Generalized Revelation Principle
Efficiency
Auktionstheorie
Informationsversorgung
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Mezzetti, Claudio
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (where)
-
Milano
- (when)
-
2003
- Handle
- Last update
-
07.04.2025, 12:45 PM CEST
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Mezzetti, Claudio
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Time of origin
- 2003
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