- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Rationalitätskonzepte, Entscheidungsverhalten und ökonomische Modellierung (Laufzeit 1997 - 2008) ; 01-15
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Schlagwort
-
Partnerschaftsgesellschaft
Unternehmensbewertung
Verhandlungstheorie
Asymmetrische Information
Auktionstheorie
Theorie
Partnerschaftsgesellschaft ; Unternehmensbewertung ; Verhandlungstheorie ; Asymmetrische Information ; Auktionstheorie
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Mannheim
- (wer)
-
Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
- (wann)
-
2001
- Urheber
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-28096
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
25.03.2025, 13:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
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Beteiligte
- Kittsteiner, Thomas
- Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
Entstanden
- 2001
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