Finite-population 'Mass-Action' and evolutionary stability

Arbeitspapier

Nash proposed an interpretation of mixed strategies as the average pure-strategy play of a population of players randomly matched to play a normal-form game. If populations are finite, some equilibria of the underlying game have no such corresponding 'mass-action' equilibrium. We show that for mixed strategy equilibria of 2 × 2 games, the requirement of such a correspondence is equivalent to neutral evolutionary stability.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3378

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
• Subject: mass action ; finite population games ; evolutionary stability ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Evolutionäre Spieltheorie ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bernergard, Axel ; Wärneryd, Karl
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2011

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46575
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET