Arbeitspapier
Finite-population 'Mass-Action' and evolutionary stability
Nash proposed an interpretation of mixed strategies as the average pure-strategy play of a population of players randomly matched to play a normal-form game. If populations are finite, some equilibria of the underlying game have no such corresponding 'mass-action' equilibrium. We show that for mixed strategy equilibria of 2 × 2 games, the requirement of such a correspondence is equivalent to neutral evolutionary stability.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3378
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- Thema
-
mass action
finite population games
evolutionary stability
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Evolutionäre Spieltheorie
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bernergard, Axel
Wärneryd, Karl
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bernergard, Axel
- Wärneryd, Karl
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2011
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