Arbeitspapier
Endogenous Lobbying
In this paper we endogenize the number and characteristics of lobbies in a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy where citizens can lobby an elected policy-maker. We find that lobbying always matters. That is, lobbying always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. Moreover, only one policy outcome emerges in equilibrium. An extremist candidate is elected and implements a centrist policy that differs from the one most preferred by the median voter. These results are in contrast with the ones obtained in the context of a citizen-candidate model where lobbies are exogenous.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 291
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Lobbying
citizen-candidate
representative democracy
electoral competition
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Felli, Leonardo
Merlo, Antonio M.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2000
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Felli, Leonardo
- Merlo, Antonio M.
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2000
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