Arbeitspapier
Competitive problem solving and the optimal prize schemes
Agents compete to solve a problem. Each agent knows own computational capacity as private information and simultaneously chooses either a risky or a safe problem solving method. This paper analyzes the optimal prize schemes from the perspective of the prize designer who wishes to find a solution as quick as possible. It is shown that (i) the winner-take-all scheme can induce excessive risk taking and make problem solving slower (ii) prize schemes with milder competitive pressure induce the optimal risk taking and quicker problem solving.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2010,083
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
optimal prize scheme
risk taking
problem solving
Wettbewerb
Anforderungsprofil
Ökonomischer Anreiz
Risikopräferenz
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Suzuki, Toru
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
- (wo)
-
Jena
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Suzuki, Toru
- Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
Entstanden
- 2010
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