Optimal sales schemes against interdependent buyers

Arbeitspapier

This paper studies a monopoly pricing problem when the seller can also choose the timing of a trade with each buyer endowed with private information about the seller's good. A buyer's valuation of the good is the weighted sum of his and other buyers' private signals, and is affected by the publicly observable outcomes of preceding transactions. We show that it is optimal for the seller to employ a sequential sales scheme in which trading with the buyers takes place one by one. Furthermore, when the degree of interdependence differs across buyers, we analyze how the optimal sales scheme orders them, and how it may induce herding among them.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 645

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Subject: timing ; monopoly pricing ; information revelation ; linkage principle ; social learning ; Monopol ; Preismanagement ; Asymmetrische Information ; Theorie ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Aoyagi, Masaki
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
• (where): Osaka
• (when): 2005

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92769
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET